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Abstract
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, are
increasingly touted as ‘humanitarian’ weapons that contribute positively
to fighting just wars and saving innocent lives. At the same time, civilian
casualties have become the most visible and criticized aspect of drone
warfare. It is argued here that drones contribute to civilian casualties not
in spite of, but because of, their unique attributes. They greatly extend
war across time and space, pulling more potential threats and targets
into play over long periods, and because they are low-risk and highly
accurate, they are more likely to be used. The assumption that drones
save lives obscures a new turn in strategic thinking that sees states such
as Israel and the US rely on large numbers of small, highly
discriminating attacks applied over time to achieve their objectives. This
examination of Israel’s 2014 war in Gaza argues that civilian casualties
are not an unexpected or unintended consequence of drone warfare, but
an entirely predictable outcome.
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https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss4/8
94 
 
Introduction 
For militaries, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offer three clear benefits over 
manned systems: Access, persistence, and accuracy. Because there is no operator 
on board the UAV itself, it can enter areas where manned missions would be 
considered too dangerous (access); because crews on the ground can be rotated, 
the UAV can stay in theatre longer, thus increasing endurance (persistence); and 
consequently, opportunities for better intelligence gathering and analysis are 
enhanced, which should make for better targeting (accuracy). It is widely 
assumed that this combination of access-persistence-accuracy will not only save 
lives on the side deploying them, but also reduce collateral damage. Because 
these weapons seem to reduce risk to human life in useful ways, drones have 
become an increasingly attractive option for policy-makers and military 
commanders alike.  
 
Civilian casualty figures are routinely used to justify or discredit any given 
military action, and drones have become a part of this discourse. Pointing to their 
unique attributes of access-persistence-accuracy, advocates tout UAVs as a more 
‘humanitarian’ military technology that contributes positively to fighting just 
wars and saving innocent lives. At the same time, civilian casualties have become 
the most visible and criticized aspect of drone warfare, and so the relationship 
between the two deserves careful consideration. It is argued here that drones 
contribute to civilian casualties not in spite of, but because of, their attributes of 
access-persistence-accuracy. Drones greatly extend war across time and space, 
pulling more potential threats and targets into play over long periods, and 
because they are low-risk and highly accurate, they are more likely to be used. 
The assumption that drones save lives obscures a new turn in strategic thinking 
that sees states such as Israel and the United States rely on large numbers of 
small, highly discriminating attacks applied over time to achieve their objectives. 
Drones are fast becoming the ne plus ultra weapon for this kind of military action.  
 
The United States uses drone warfare in counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan, 
Yemen and Somalia, with significant loss of civilian life and amid much 
controversy. In Pakistan, for example, some 416 to 957 civilians were killed in 
401 U.S. drone strikes between 2004 and October 31 2014.1 President Barack 
Obama countered criticism of his drone warfare policy in a 2013 speech at the 
                                                        
1Jack Serle and Abigail Fielding-Smith, "October 2014 Update: US covert actions in 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia,” Bureau of Investigative Journalism, November 3, 2014, 
available at: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/11/03/october-2014-update-
us-covert-actions-in-pakistan-yemen-and-somalia/; Obama has authorized more than 
431 targeted killings against suspected militants and terrorists, which have killed over 
3,300 people; Micah Zenko, “Barack Obama and the ‘Wimp Factor’,” Foreign Policy, 
September 10, 2014, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/10 
/barack_obama_and_the_wimp_factor_toughness_syria_putin. 
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National Defence University, suggesting that it was in fact a more humanitarian 
option than other military alternatives: “Conventional airpower or missiles are 
far less precise than drones, and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and 
more local outrage,” he said.2  
 
Drone warfare was also featured prominently in Operation Protective Edge, an 
Israeli military action that took place between July 8 and August 26, 2014 in the 
Gaza strip. Again, the extent of civilian casualties drew heavy international 
criticism. During the operation, which was ostensibly aimed at stopping Hamas 
from firing rockets at Israel, over 2100 Palestinians were killed. By Israel’s own 
admission, some 53 percent of them were civilian; the UN puts the number near 
70 percent.3 Much has been made of the efforts Israel made to avoid such civilian 
casualties: the Israeli Foreign Ministry stressed it had used “the most 
sophisticated weapons available today in order to pinpoint and target only 
legitimate military objectives and minimize collateral damage to civilians.” 4 The 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) emphasised the important role drones played in 
helping it minimize civilian deaths.5 The Israeli efforts were praised by the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Martin Dempsey, who noted that, 
“Israel went to extraordinary lengths to limit collateral damage and civilian 
casualties” and said “the Pentagon had sent a ‘lessons-learned team’… to work 
with the IDF to see what could be learned from the Gaza operation,” including its 
efforts to limit civilian casualties.6  
 
There is indeed much to be learned. An investigation of Operation Protective 
Edge as an example of the rapidly maturing art of drone warfare can help explain  
the apparently paradoxical problem of how reliance on drones may increase, 
rather than decrease, civilian casualties.  
 
                                                        
2 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” The 
White House, May 23, 2013, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university. 
3 Dan Williams, “Israel says has evidence 47 percent of Gaza dead were combatants,” 
Reuters, August 2, 2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/02/us-
mideast-gaza-casualties-idUSKBN0G20HF20140802; “Gaza Crisis: Toll of Operations 
in Gaza," BBC News, September 1, 2014, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-28439404.  
4 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Behind the Headlines: Fighting Hamas Terrorism 
within the Law,” August 7, 2014, available at: 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/Fighting-Hamas-terrorism-
within-the-law.aspx. 
5 “Special Interview: How IDF UAVs Saved Lives in Gaza,” Israeli Defense Forces blog, 
August 31, 2014, available at: http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/08/31/special-
interview-how-idf-uavs-saved-lives-in-gaza/. 
6 “Dempsey: Israel went to 'extraordinary length' to avoid civilian casualties in Gaza,” 
Haaretz, November 7, 2014, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/1.625194. 
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Drones, Civilian Casualties, and Just War Theory 
In Just War Theory, the just conduct of a war (jus in bello) requires that civilian 
casualties are to be avoided—but not at all costs.7 Civilian deaths are acceptable 
under certain conditions regarding proportionality, distinction, and necessity. 
The response must be proportionate to the threat; distinctions must be drawn 
between combatants and civilians; and any action taken must be defensible as 
militarily necessary. While just war conventions are famously difficult to qualify 
or quantify, and the international laws of war they inform often prove difficult to 
apply or administer, if it can be shown that these conditions are met, collateral 
damage can be justified.  
 
It is clear that the access-persistence-accuracy nexus of drones significantly 
improves the ability to satisfy these conditions. Drones provide better situational 
awareness and more opportunities, thereby aiding tactical patience, plus their 
smaller payloads and more precise delivery minimize the risks of unintended 
casualties. These qualities are demonstrated by the use of drones to carry out 
targeted killings in which specific individuals are assassinated, often in difficult 
circumstances. With their abilities to pierce the fog of war, it would seem that 
drones are effective tools for upholding jus in bello conventions, but by looking 
beyond their more obvious capabilities, the wider implications of their use 
become apparent.  
 
Lowering the Threshold for Military Action 
The first problem raised by drones is that they lower the threshold for using 
military force in the first place. Because they decrease risk for the deploying side, 
that side is more inclined to use them in situations that would have been deemed 
too risky in the past, or that would have been resolved through law enforcement. 
The U.S. use of drones in Pakistan since 2004 demonstrates this point well: the 
U.S. would not have sent 309 manned missions into Pakistan, a state it was never 
at war with, to neutralize targets – the political and diplomatic fall-out would 
have been deemed far too high in all but the most serious cases of military 
necessity, a point that Obama himself has acknowledged: 
 
“It’s… not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to 
capture every terrorist. Even when such an approach may be possible, there 
are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local 
civilians…times when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major 
international crisis.”8  
                                                        
7 For a discussion of how drones fit within the conventions of just war and international 
law, see Ann Rogers and John Hill, Unmanned: drone warfare and global security 
(London/Toronto: Pluto/Between the Lines, 2014), 103-113.  
8 Obama, “Remarks by the President...”  
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The decision to mount a manned mission to kill bin Laden was a rare exception, 
and the debate within the U.S. administration over the merits of a drone attack 
versus other options demonstrates why drones are so attractive.9 Obama noted 
that, “our operation in Pakistan against Usama bin Ladin cannot be the 
norm. The risks in that case were immense.”10 Drones mitigate that risk 
significantly, but in doing so, as Kreps and Zenko suggest, they also “create a 
particular moral hazard by keeping pilots away from danger. Because the costs of 
launching deadly strikes with drones are lower than with piloted aircraft, civilian 
officials are more willing to authorize them.”11 The problem is, of course, that 
such attacks inevitably create opportunities for harming civilians.  
 
The Disposability of Civilians 
Drones increase opportunity for military action, which in itself increases the 
likelihood of collateral damage, but it remains to be explained why high numbers 
of civilian casualties persist when avoiding collateral damage is supposedly hard-
wired into modern militaries and when drones would seem to possess ideal 
capabilities for discrimination in targeting and precision attacks. Here, the work 
of Zygmunt Bauman is helpful. Exposing the underlying power biases that inform 
the current world order, Bauman argues that global inequality renders some 
segments of society “disposable,” in economic, political and also military terms—
the so-called “collateral damage” of globalization. Gross inequalities in power 
produce “a selective affinity between social inequality and the likelihood of 
becoming a casualty.”12  
 
Thus for Bauman, “thinking in terms of collateral damage tacitly assumes an 
already existing inequality of rights and chances, while accepting a priori the 
unequal distribution of the costs of the undertaking (or for that matter desisting 
                                                        
9 According to Bowden, three options were mooted: 1) An air assault on the compound 
was dismissed because the air force calculated 30 precision bombs would be needed, 
which could lead to significant casualties and could not guarantee success, 2) A single 
drone attack on Bin Laden himself was ruled out because if the assassination attempt 
failed, Bin Laden would vanish, 3) A manned helicopter raid was chosen because people 
on the ground could verify results, gather evidence and was comparatively low-risk. 
Zenko quotes retired Adm. William McRaven who said it, "was a standard raid and really 
not very sexy" and "We did 11 other raids much like that in Afghanistan that night"; Mark 
Bowden, “The hunt for Geronimo,” Vanity Fair, November 2012, available at: 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/11/inside-osama-bin-laden-assassination-
plot; Zenko, “Barack Obama and the 'Wimp Factor'.” 
10 Obama, “Remarks by the President...” 
11 Sarah Kreps and Micah Zenko, “The next drone wars: preparing for proliferation,” 
Foreign Affairs, March-April, 2014, available at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140746/sarah-kreps-and-micah-zenko/the-
next-drone-wars. 
12 Bauman, Zygmunt, Collateral Damage: Social Inequalities in a Global Age 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 5. 
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from) action.” For militaries specifically, the decision to use force even when 
civilian lives are risked is “easier” and “more likely” because “the people who 
decided about the worthiness of taking the risk were not the ones who would 
suffer the consequences of taking it.”13 Bauman’s argument signals an important 
departure from the more usual efforts to determine what is acceptable in terms of 
collateral damage because it posits a pre-existing imbalance that tilts the attacker 
in favor of undertaking the attack.  
 
The Power of Distance  
There are also more abstract factors associated with drones that further intensify 
a tilt towards mounting an attack despite the potential risk to civilians. First, the 
very presence of a drone presupposes the existence of a threat: Anderson has 
investigated this more generally in terms of U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine that 
posits a “pre-insurgent” population that “is addressed as an unstable collective of 
actual and potential enemies and actual and potential friends,” from which “new 
categories of people outside of a civilian/combatant distinction emerge.”14 Second, 
Kaplan suggests that the ability to survey a theatre of operations from a “godlike” 
aerial perspective such as that afforded by a UAV bestows a sense of power on the 
viewer: that power inheres in the aerial gaze itself and lends itself to the 
construction of a dehumanized “monster-enemy.”15 Third, Gregory discusses the 
mediated nature of the drone gaze, which distances the viewer-participant from 
the danger of actual battle while facilitating an intimate view of its sturm und 
drang.16 Decades of research have struggled to link mediated violence—i.e. as 
experienced on television or in gaming—with real world aggression, and it seems 
unlikely that nascent research into committing aggressive acts via mediated 
weapons such as drones will provide clear answers anytime soon.17  
 
It is not clear how these various aspects around the mediated, militarized, aerial 
gaze of the drone fit together or how they may influence decision-making when it 
comes to killing others, even among those who are operating the drones. In a U.S. 
Air Force UAV unit involved in fighting the Islamic State from their base in 
Langley, Virginia, a reporter found that: 
                                                        
13 Ibid. 
14 Ben Anderson, “Facing the future enemy: US counter-insurgency doctrine and the pre-
insurgent,” Theory, Culture and Society 28:7-8 (2011): 216-240, 222. 
15 Caren Kaplan, “Mobility and war: the cosmic view of US ‘air power’,” Environment and 
Planning A 38:2 (2006): 395-407. 
16 Derek Gregory, “Deadly embrace: war, distance and intimacy,” The British Academy 
Lecture, 10-11 Carlton House Terrace, London, March 14, 2012, available at: 
www.britac.ac.uk/events/2012/Gregory-balec.cfm. 
17 For Vasilkas K Pozios, Praveen R. Kambam and H Eric Bender, “Does Media Violence 
Lead to the Real Thing?” New York Times, August 23, 2013, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/opinion/sunday/does-media-violence-lead-to-
the-real-thing.html?_r=0. 
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“The airmen—the title applies to female pilots, too—can’t agree among 
themselves whether they’re at war. Some think they should qualify for a 
coveted combat patch—right now they don’t—while others say it’s harder to 
fight a war when one is not actually there. They say they must resist 
thinking they’re playing a video game.”18  
 
To sum up, taken in isolation, drones seem to be ideal weapons for ensuring that 
military force is limited, highly discriminating and restrained. However, seen in a 
wider context, we note that calculations of civilian risk take place in the context of 
global power imbalances that render some civilians as somehow expendable or 
disposable; that for policymakers, these are weapons that enhance and expand 
opportunities for military action, thus making such action more likely; and that 
the mediated and distant nature of their deployments may lead to the creation 
and dehumanization of targets. Drones as a technology may skew the balance 
toward mounting attacks to achieve military objectives despite potential 
collateral costs. 
 
Israel and Drone Warfare  
Israel is a world leader in the development, use and export of unmanned military 
systems with long experience with the technologies. Drone Wars UK reported 
that Israel has been developing drones for some forty years and has used armed 
drones in battle since 2004 (although Israel does not admit this).19 The modern 
generation of drones is used mainly for intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Although these missions are not deadly, they are 
hardly benign: ISR itself assumes the existence of threat and leads to target 
acquisition. Furthermore, populations that fall under the gaze of drones feel 
threatened and harassed by their presence.20  
 
Large numbers of drones were fully integrated into Operation Protective Edge, 
Israel’s 2014 military action in the Gaza Strip. Unmanned ground systems probed 
Hamas tunnels; artillery brigades used man-portable UAVs to monitor 
operations along the border, while overhead, large drones, including the debut of 
the one-ton Hermes 900, provided intelligence, designated targets and dropped 
bombs. By meshing drones with more traditional capabilities, the IDF was able to 
                                                        
18 Nancy A. Youssef, “Use of drones against Islamic State changes the meaning of warfare,” 
McClatchy DC, November 19, 2014, available at: 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/11/19/247443_use-of-drones-against-
islamic.html?rh=1#storylink=cpy. 
19 Dobbing, Mary and Chris Cole, Israel and the Drone Wars: Examining Israel’s 
Production, Use and Proliferation of UAVs (Oxford, London: Drone Wars UK Peace 
House, January 2014), 5. 
20 Sair, Atef Abu, Sleepless in Gaza: Israeli Drone War on the Gaza Strip (Palestine: Rosa 
Luxembourg Stiftung, 2014), 33-4. 
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leverage increasingly complex data sets to create a fuller picture of the 
operational environment and co-ordinate a mix of drones and manned aircraft, 
and in some cases, ground forces to deadly effect. For example, Haaretz reported 
on a tank brigade hit by mortar fire: the commander said, “A UAV sent the 
coordinates of the enemy mortar to the tank instantly, and the tank attacked.”21 
While this demonstrates the dynamic roles drones played during the conflict, 
much of their work was accomplished long before Operation Protective Edge 
began.  
 
Extending War Through Time 
Shaul Shahar, a high ranking executive in the Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI) and a 
former UAV squadron commander in the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate, said that, 
“UAVs have become an inseparable part of today’s battlefield, and are of the 
utmost importance.” Speaking shortly after Protective Edge concluded, he 
stressed that the presence of drones before and during the operation likely 
reduced collateral damage:  
 
“UAVs make a decisive contribution, beginning at the stages prior to the 
actual battle, in minimizing the damage to the civilian population, through 
the real-time accompaniment of the entire course of the fighting, to the 
analysis of the results of the various moves made on the battlefield. Without 
the UAVs’ involvement and accompaniment, there is no doubt that the 
chances of collateral damage would have been much higher.”22 
 
It is the extensive surveillance activities undertaken by drones prior to the 
conflict that contributed to the subsequent collateral damage. Israel’s drones had 
spent years acquiring targets in Gaza, and sometimes neutralizing them: some 
825 people were killed in drone attacks between June 2006 and October 2011 
according to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights.23 Within this period, 
“dozens” were killed during Operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008 to January 
18, 2009), including perhaps eighty-seven civilians, numbers that attest to the 
scale of drone operations that were taking place over Gaza.24 
 
                                                        
21 Gili Cohen, “IDF’s intel tech advances put to the test n Gaza,” Haaretz, August 3 2014, 
available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-gaza-conflict-
2014/1.608537. 
22 JV staff, “Israel Aviation Industry: ‘UAVs are an Inseparable Part of the Fighting,’” 
Jewish Voice, September 17, 2014, available at: 
http://jewishvoiceny.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8587:isra
el-aviation-industry-quavs-are-an-inseparable-part-of-the-
fighting&catid=99:defense&Itemid=282. 
23 Dobbing and Cole, Israel and the Drone Wars, 16. 
24 Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong: Gaza Residents Killed by Israeli Drone-
Launched Missiles (New York, Human Rights Watch, 2009), 3.  
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Extensive and prolonged drone activity in advance of battle paid off in terms of 
providing potential targets. A senior commander of the Israel Air Force’s (IAF) 
First UAV Squadron said on the IDF’s blog that:  
 
“We gather a lot of information which eventually gives us the ability to 
detect targets that need to be attacked. This is why the minute Operation 
Protective Edge began, the air force already had a large ‘bank’ of targets.”25  
 
This “bank” of targets translated into a huge number of strikes when the shooting 
war finally began on July 8, 2014. The IDF says that it struck 4,762 terror targets 
between July 8 and August 5, including “1,678 rocket launching facilities, 977 
command and control centers, 237 military administration facilities, 191 weapons 
storage and manufacturing facilities, 144 training and military compounds and 
1,535 “additional terror sites.”26 Each of the 4,762 targets would likely receive 
multiple hits from multiple platforms.27 Furthermore, the way the Israel defined 
“threat” meant that much of Gaza was considered targetable: the New York 
Times reported on July 30 that fully 44 percent of Gaza had become a no-go 
zone.28 
 
Target Practice: Operation Cast Lead  
Choosing targets—and choosing to neutralize them—are human decisions, and 
drones are ostensibly just tools that are used to carry them out. However, these 
particular tools offer capabilities that affect how decisions are made. There is 
little transparency around how Israel selects its targets and whether these choices 
should be considered legitimate under international humanitarian law, but what 
is plain is that Israel takes a great deal of care in choosing them. Something of the 
IDF’s target acquisition and air war praxis in Protective Edge can be extrapolated 
by reviewing analyses of the earlier Operation Cast Lead that were undertaken by 
Anthony Cordesman and Human Rights Watch (HRW).29 
 
                                                        
25 Israeli Defense Forces, “Special Interview.” 
26 “Operation Protective Edge by the Numbers,” Israeli Defense Forces blog, August 5, 
2014, available at: http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/08/05/operation-protective-
edge-numbers/. 
27 Drones Wars UK estimates there were over 800 separate drone strikes during the 
operation; Chris Cole, “UK drone exports – a peek behind the curtain,” Drone Wars UK, 
November 19, 2014, available at: http://dronewars.net/2014/11/19/uk-drone-exports-a-
peek-behind-the-curtain/.  
28 “Assessing the damage and destruction in Gaza,” New York Times, 30 July 2014. 
29 Anthony Cordesman, The ‘Gaza War’: A Strategic Analysis," Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, February 2, 2009, available at: http://csis.org/publication/gaza-
war; Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong; It should be noted that Cordesman has 
been criticized for his reliance on Israeli sources, and HRW for its reliance on Palestinian 
ones.  
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Cordesman found that in the years preceding Operation Cast Lead, Israel used 
imagery, communications and human intelligence to develop what he called a 
“remarkably accurate picture of Hamas targets in Gaza that it constantly updated 
on a near realtime basis” and noted that drones were used to contribute to the 
IAF’s targeting plan that “included some 603 major targets, and which treated 
virtually every known Hamas location or residence as a potential area of 
operations and part of the Hamas leadership and military infrastructure.” 
[Emphasis Added]30 He quotes Defense News analyst Barbara Opall-Rome who 
reported that a target was defined as, “an object by which its nature, location, 
purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total 
or partial destruction in the circumstances ruling at the time gives a definite 
military advantage.” In short, the threat emanating from the region was broadly 
defined even as the presence of civilians was duly weighed. Cordesman writes 
that, “Every aspect of this plan was based on a detailed target analysis that 
explicitly evaluated the risk to civilians and the location of sensitive sites like 
schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, and other holy sites.”  
 
The HRW investigation notes that it did not have explicit information about 
Israeli practices, but observed that Israeli drones had advanced visual capabilities 
and the ability to loiter over the battle theatre without risk for hours. In other 
words, there was time enough, and information enough, to ensure that “drone 
operators who exercised the proper degree of care should have been able to tell 
the difference between legitimate targets and civilians.”31 HRW found that in the 
six cases it examined involving civilian deaths by drone, “the IDF repeatedly 
failed to verify that its targets constituted military objectives” and that, “Israel’s 
targeting choices led to the loss of many civilian lives.”32 It called for 
investigations into specific attacks to assess whether international humanitarian 
law had been upheld.  
 
The central point is that drones enabled the IDF to undertake detailed, extensive, 
and discriminating targeting of Gaza, before and during the actual fighting. The 
killing of civilians may be down to differing interpretations of military necessity, 
or in some cases, in how combatants and non-combatants are distinguished from 
one another.33 But it is the drone gaze that enables these targets to be ‘called into 
                                                        
30 Cordesman, “Gaza War,” 16-17. 
31 Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong, 4. 
32 Ibid, 3. 
33 Israel has been actively working to have its views on non-combatant protections 
accepted as part of customary international law; Jeff Halper, “Globalizing Gaza,” 
Counterpunch, August 18, 2014, available at: 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/18/globalizing-gaza/; The US has infamously 
defined combatants in some areas as “all military-age males in a strike zone...unless there 
is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent; Jo Becker and Scott Shane, 
“Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” New York Times, May 29, 
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being’. The same disruptive dynamics of ‘big data’ that see the delivery of vast 
amounts of detailed information delivered at warp speed may well inhere in 
military target acquisition. The implication is that finding more targets may lead 
to more attacks.  
 
Fighting in Gaza 
Israeli military planners face two large problems in Gaza. First, in a highly 
urbanized environment, collateral damage is likely no matter how surgical a 
strike is. Second, citing military necessity, Hamas operates in civilian areas in 
order to deter Israeli attacks. While both unethical and illegal, this is a tactic 
characteristic of weaker sides in highly asymmetric conflicts, and the fact of it 
does not exempt the other side from adhering to the laws of war. Furthermore, 
both Israel and Hamas are aware of how important propaganda is to their cause 
and factor it into their military planning. Civilian casualties draw global attention 
and international pressure, and the prospect of prosecution for war crimes may 
lead states to use force with restraint. This bleeding of politics into operations 
places limits on military commanders.  
 
Israel says that it fights according to international law, takes great efforts to avoid 
civilian casualties, and cites its use of drones as an important element in meeting 
these goals. In March 2014, IDF drone operator Captain “N” told CBN News:  
 
“Probably the most important thing that the UAVs help during combat is to 
distinguish terrorists from civilians because most of the enemy techniques 
here in the region is to operate from civilian areas. We really don't want to 
hurt civilians during combat.”34  
 
He suggested that this enhanced intelligence would inhibit the IDF from 
undertaking some attacks: “We can't really hit and destroy the targets and the 
people that we want to destroy because we consider the population and the 
civilians who are around those kinds of terrorists.” A senior commander of First 
UAV Squadron noted that the ability to extend intelligence collection across time 
was vital to target acquisition:  
 
“Every few months, it is essential to check that the target is still relevant. If 
you find a weapons storage facility today, tomorrow they could take all of 
the weapons out of the building and build a kindergarten. If I don’t know 
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about that change, I might accidentally target it. That’s why we don’t only 
find new targets; we also keep track of the existing ones.”35  
 
Amid the controversy surrounding the devastation wrought during Operation 
Protective Edge, Israel mounted a public relations effort to showcase the specific 
actions it took to minimize damage.36 Along with dropping leaflets and making 
phone calls to warn civilians of impending attacks, the IDF used ‘roof-knocking’, 
the practice of sending in small ‘non-lethal’ missiles to warn civilians to flee in 
advance of a larger strike. This is widely condemned because, unlike leaflets or 
phone calls, the warning itself is a form of attack, and overall its efficacy is 
questionable. In some cases, whether through choice or compulsion, people move 
up onto the rooftops to deter impending attacks, and in response, sometimes 
attacks are modified, lessened, or aborted. A senior IDF UAV commander said, 
“As a policy, the ‘First UAV Squadron’ orders the abortion of airstrikes if they put 
civilians at risk.”37 However, a ‘military necessity’ would override the general 
policy.  
 
The Israeli Way of War 
The thousands of dead and injured and the devastation of homes and 
infrastructure have fuelled accusations that the Israeli actions during Protective 
Edge were indiscriminate. As it was after 2009’s Operation Cast Lead, Israel is 
being accused of war crimes and is itself investigating some of the more egregious 
incidents in an effort to stave off action by the International Criminal Court. It 
maintains its conduct was within acceptable limits. The Israeli Foreign Ministry 
stated:  
 
“Israel acknowledges that despite the precautions taken, military operations 
inevitably lead to a loss of civilian life and property. Yet civilian deaths and 
damage to property, no matter how regrettable and unfortunate, do not 
necessarily mean that violations of international law as such have 
occurred.” [Original Emphasis]38 
 
As Israeli targeting of Gaza appears to have been highly discriminating, a more 
serious problem may lie in how its view of legitimate attacks differs from the 
global “norm.” Israel is a state that faces genuine threats from all sides in an 
unstable region. In on-going multi-stranded conflicts, the Palestinian populations 
                                                        
35 Israeli Defense Forces, “Special Interview.”  
36 Israeli Defense Forces, “The IDF’s Efforts to Minimize Civilian Casualties in Gaza,” 
Israeli Defense Forces blog, available at: 
http://www.idfblog.com/operationgaza2014/#Casualties, contains videos, tweets, 
article and infographics that chronicle these efforts.  
37 Israeli Defense Forces, “Special Interview.”  
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not only try to assert their own agendas, but also become proxies for larger 
interests. Israel’s inability to resolve long-standing territorial issues or to reach 
peaceful accommodation with its rivals means it exists in a state of chronic 
insecurity. Since its withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, it has skirmished with 
insurgent group Hamas constantly, and on occasion those skirmishes have flared 
into major but inconclusive operations such as Operation Cast Lead (2008-9), 
Pillar of Defense (2012), and now Protective Edge (2014). Israel maintains that 
its actions are necessary to maintaining its national security.  
 
The Dahiya Doctrine 
The scale of death and destruction in Gaza during Protective Edge has been 
described as “collective punishment” and/or as an old-school military action 
designed to break a population’s morale through heavy bombardment. There is 
speculation that Israel followed the Dahiya Doctrine, a controversial strategy that 
was revealed in a U.S. State Department cable released by wikileaks.39 The cable 
described an interview given by a senior Israeli military commander, General 
Gadi Eisenkot in 2008:  
 
“Eisenkot labeled any Israeli response to resumed conflict the ‘Dahiya 
doctrine’ in reference to the leveled Dahiya quarter in Beirut during the 
Second Lebanon War in 2006. He said Israel will use disproportionate 
force upon any village that fires upon Israel, ‘causing great damage and 
destruction’. Eisenkot made very clear: this is not a recommendation, but 
an already approved plan—from the Israeli perspective, these are “not 
civilian villages, they are military bases.” [Emphasis Added]40 
 
The Dahiya doctrine thus espoused is intended to deter through the threat of 
heavy punishment. What may be significant is what Eisenkot clearly describes as 
“disproportionate” was parsed by the State Department official who penned the 
cable as “indiscriminate”; the writer characterized the Dahiya doctrine as a 
“policy to respond with indiscriminate force against Lebanon should hostilities 
resume.” This blurs an important difference between the two just war conditions 
of discrimination and proportionality. Eisenkot’s remarks are intended to deter, 
but also show that Israel is willing to use force in specific ways—including 
disproportionate force—in order to achieve its objectives.  
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Israel’s interpretation of what is militarily necessary is met with sympathy in 
many quarters. Concerning Operation Protective Edge, CJCS General Dempsey 
noted that, “The IDF is not interested in creating civilian casualties. They're 
interested in stopping the shooting of rockets and missiles out of the Gaza Strip 
and into Israel.”41  
 
Drones as Future Weapons  
Although Israel is ostensibly engaged in counter-terrorism operations against 
Hamas, its strategy bears more than passing resemblance to attrition warfare. 
Freedman notes that the “key characteristic” of this deeply unfashionable 
strategy has historically been to wear down the enemy:  
 
“Which meant the process was likely to be protracted, gradual, and 
piecemeal. While it could end with a decisive battle, it could also lead to a 
negotiation when both sides had decided that they had had enough. The 
danger was that attrition would turn into a contest of endurance, and it was 
hard to know in advance when the enemy would be worn down.”42  
 
With no easy military or political solutions on offer, Israel is attempting to 
degrade its enemies’ capabilities in order to maintain its own security. Drones are 
well suited to this kind of long-term strategy even where the end game is not 
annihilation, but co-existence.  
 
The enemy, too, adapts. Operation Protective Edge revealed the extent to which 
Hamas had already moved much of its activity underground to defeat Israeli ISR 
and aerial strike. Furthermore, while its operational capabilities are weak 
compared to Israel’s, it has continued to regroup, retrain and improve its ability 
to harass and undermine Israeli security and in doing so has become a 
formidable enemy.43 During the conflict, Hamas flew its own surveillance drones, 
while its tactics, tunnels networks, and deployment of booby traps and 
improvised explosive devices all speak to its increasing sophistication.  
 
The targeting process for Operation Protective Edge was likely consistent with 
previous Israeli practice, but the use of drones to extend security in time and 
space increased the number of targets identified. This, when combined with a 
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willingness to inflict collateral damage as a necessary part of fighting Hamas, can 
account for the high level of civilian casualties. What may be unique is the highly 
discriminating nature of the fighting: a far cry from the carpet bombing 
associated with wars of attrition, Israel carried out thousands of very small 
attacks to achieve the same effect. This models a highly networked approach to 
war where decision-making is dispersed and highly fragmented, but the effects, 
in aggregate, are devastating.  
 
Conclusion 
In the future—perhaps by 2030—advanced militaries plan to have drone and 
other exotic technologies that go beyond mere persistence to achieve permanence, 
giving them operational abilities, from ISR through target acquisition to kinetic 
operations that will be available always and everywhere.44 In planning for an era 
of long, small, inconclusive wars against inchoate enemies and constantly 
evolving threats, the drone’s future seems assured.  
 
In theory, and especially in the rhetoric of the civilian and military commanders 
who advocate their use, drones hold out the prospect that this will be a ‘more 
humanitarian’ way of warfare. The lesson emerging from Gaza is that in practice 
the opposite effect is achieved. Not only does their persistent presence traumatize 
subject populations during peacetime, but when the shooting starts, drones 
encourage planners to mount large numbers of attacks on the grounds that they 
are likely to be more accurate and therefore less damaging. We should not 
automatically assume that weapons of mass destruction are large and few—they 
can be small and many. Stalin supposedly remarked that “quantity has a quality 
all its own,” an observation that should be borne in mind by militaries relying on 
drones in the hope of fighting more just wars. 
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